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LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF STUDENT
DISMISSALS: A VIEW FROM THE LAW SCHOOL
by
Penn Lerblance*
T HE dismissal of a student from a law school for academic or discipli-
nary reasons is a traumatic experience for the individual whose educa-
tional and career opportunities are so terminated or impaired. The
dismissal process may also have significant impact on the vitality of the
school's operation and its achievement of educational goals. There is little
doubt that a "University, as an academic community, can formulate its
own standards, rewards and punishments to achieve its educational objec-
tives."' Thus, the university has the inherent power to formulate and en-
force rules of student conduct that are "appropriate and necessary" to the
maintenance of order where reasonably necessary to further the institu-
tion's educational goals.2 Similarly, it has power to regulate academic pro-
gress.3 It follows that a student's failure to comply with rules of conduct or
standards for academic progress may legitimately result in dismissal. Ac-
cordingly, it can be argued that the dismissal process for a student in col-
lege or professional school is within the sound discretion of the institution.
There are, however, certain legal constraints on the dismissal process.
The judicial characterization of the student-university relationship as in
loco parentis or as contractual may affect how a student may be dismissed.
If the institution is a state entity, there are constitutional due process limi-
tations whether the dismissal is for misconduct or academic deficiencies.
Beyond these legal requirements, educational considerations may also be
present, namely, whether the nature of the institution as a law school itself
affords any constraints on the dismissal process.
Although the manner in which educational institutions discipline and
dismiss students may not be the pressing problem it was in the late 1960's,
that fact should not deter an appraisal of the dismissal process. A reexami-
nation of student dismissal procedures is valuable if the handling of disci-
plinary matters is not viewed as a mere expediency, but considered for its
symbolic impact and educational potential in legal education. Such an
inquiry begins with a survey of the legal requirements involved in the dis-
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1. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 885, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,
476 (1967).
2. Id at 879, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
3. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), discussed at notes 149-73 infra
and accompanying text.
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missal of a student from school as relevant to a law student. This back-
ground of legal constraints provides a perspective from which the
educational potential of the dismissal process can be considered.4
I. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR REGULATION OF THE STUDENT-
UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP
A. In Loco Parentis
American institutions of higher education once held tight reins on their
students, unfettered by external intervention. Students were expelled from
universities for a variety of innocuous reasons such as smoking,' joining a
secret club,6 and not being "a typical Syracuse girl."' One student was
summarily dismissed from law school for maliciously accusing a fellow
student of sending annoying letters to a female law student.' Religious
and political beliefs were also the subject of university discipline, as one
student was dismissed for being a "fanatical atheist"9 and another for giv-
ing a speech encouraging draft resistance.' ° Both the summary process
used and the reason for dismissal were deemed within the exclusive discre-
tion of the university since the relationship between the school and student
was characterized in family terms. Under the doctrine of in loco parentis
the courts viewed schools as being in a parental relation to their students. "
"[A] schoolmaster is regarded as standing in loco parentis, and, like the
parent, has the authority to moderately chastise pupils under his care."' 2
One application of this theory is found in the summary dismissal of a fe-
male student by a school's dean of women upon the assertion that the
young lady was habituated to tobacco and had been seen in public on the
lap of a young man. When the young lady challenged the dismissal in
court, the school's action was upheld. The court commended the dean for
her "motherly interest" in the plaintiff and observed that the plaintiffs
public defiance of the school was itself sufficient basis for disciplinary ac-
tion. 13
Adherence to this doctrine as defining the student-school relation has
4. The scope of this Article is limited to the theme as stated. It is not intended to give
comprehensive treatment to the subject of student rights as such, nor to evaluate different
kinds of disciplinary systems that might be employed by a school, nor to propose an ideal
code of conduct. For a bibliography on the subject of student rights, see Van Alstyne, The
Student as University Resident, 45 DEN. L.J. 582, 612-13 (1968); Symposium: Student Rights
and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 177-78 (1966); Project, An Overview: The Private
University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795, 808-10.
5. McClintock v. Lake Forest Univ., 222 Ill. App. 468 (1921).
6. People ex rel Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866).
7. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
8. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 A.D. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902).
9. Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
10. Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202, a7'd, 181
A.D. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917).
11. See R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 25-56 (1965);
Holland, The Student and the Law, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 61, 66 (1969).
12. Roberson v. State, 22 Ala. App. 413, 414, 116 So. 317, 317 (1928).
13. Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 253, 197 N.W. 510, 513 (1924).
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now diminished to the point that its continued viability is doubtful. This
development is due in part to the changing character of American colleges
and in part to the logical flaws in the in loco parentis doctrine. Many
universities have become so large that there is no longer a perceptible re-
semblance to a family. 4 Aside from the impersonal relationship, it is diffi-
cult to speak of the university as a substitute parent when most of the
students have reached the age of majority 5 or are married or otherwise
free of parental control.16 Moreover, the parent analogy breaks down
when it is remembered that real parents would not be allowed to "evict"
their child. 17 Another flaw in the parental delegation idea arises if parents
instruct the university to act toward their child in a manner inconsistent
with its own rules.' 8 Given these considerations, it is unlikely that a court
today would view a law school as standing in loco parentis to a student,
with essentially unfettered authority to discipline. 9
B. Contract
The relationship between student and university can also be described
under a contractual theory.2" A student may "agree to grant to the institu-
tion an optional right to terminate the relations between them."'" Under
this theory the student and university have agreed to certain terms which
limit the rights of students and result in the imposition of sanctions when
violated. The contract provisions are usually scattered throughout a vari-
ety of documents such as admission and registration forms, catalogues or
bulletins, and school rules and regulations.2 2 Such provisions may be im-
14. See Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. REV. 290, 294 (1968).
15. See id at 294; Holland, supra note 11, at 66. In Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876-77 n.l 1, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 n.l 1 (1967) (citation omitted),
the court said:
In earlier decades in loco parentis had some superficial appeal because the
vast majority of college students were below 18. Today, in contrast, there are
more students between the ages of 30 and 35 in universities than there are
those under 18, and the latter group account for only seven percent of the total
college enrollment ....
The age of majority has been reduced from age 21 to age 18 in many jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1979).
16. Note, The Scope of University Discipline, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 486, 487 (1969).
17. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 295.
18. Holland, supra note 11, at 68.
19. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968): "[T]he doctrine of'In Loco
Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university community ...... Goldberg v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967) (footnote omitted):
"[S]tate universities' should no longer stand in loco parentis in relation to their students."
20. Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504
(1972): "The basic legal relation between a student and a private university or college is
contractual in nature." See also Searle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 Cal. App. 3d 448, 452,
100 Cal. Rptr. 194, 196 (1972); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 490, 231 N.Y.S.
435, 439 (1928).
21. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 490, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 439 (1928).
22. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643, 651 (1966). "The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institu-
tion made available to the matriculant become a part of the contract." Zumbrun v. Univer-
sity of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (1972).
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plied as well as expressed 23 and may consist of any "reasonable condition"
determined subsequent to commencement of the relationship.24
The difficulty of imputing to the student knowledge of even the express
contract terms located in the full complement of university bulletins, regu-
lations, and forms is one troublesome aspect of the contract theory.25 It is
doubtful whether students are aware that they have entered into a com-
mercial transaction.26 Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect that students
would or could read the mass of regulations and forms typical of the mod-
em university. 27 Thus, if the student-university relation is contractual, it
may be characterized as a contract of adhesion. If so, its disciplinary terms
may not be given full effect because of the absence of a meaningful bar-
gain, in that the university unilaterally dictates the terms and possesses
disproportionate bargaining power.28
Despite this criticism, the contract doctrine is currently cited by courts as
the governing relation between students and the university, especially
when the school is a private university.29 While reliance upon the contract
theory historically has maximized the school's discretion and limited stu-
dent rights,3" such a result is not required by the nature of the doctrine.
One court has observed that "'a contract between the student and the in-
stitution is created containing two implied conditions: (1) that the student
will not be arbitrarily expelled, and (2) that the student will submit himself
to reasonable rules and regulations for the breach of which, in a proper
case, he may be expelled. . . .' "' The arbitrary denial in bad faith of a
student's readmission by a university has been held to state an actionable
claim for specific performance of a contract between the university and the
23. See, e.g., Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 535 (1972); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589
(1909); Comment, 4 Student's Right to Hearing on Dismissalfrom a University, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 746, 747 (1958).
24. Giles v. Howard Univ., 428 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D.D.C. 1977). In disallowing plain-
till's claim that his dismissal from medical school for failure to satisfy probation conditions
violated the school promotion statement, which did not contain the unsatisfied conditions,
the court held the promotion statement permitted his dismissal or retention upon compli-
ance with any reasonable condition.
25. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 22, at 652-53; Kutner, Habeas Scholastica: An
Ombudsman for Academic Due Process-A Proposal, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 143 (1968);
Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced-Guidelinesfor University Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 314 (1968).
26. Developments in the Law,-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1147 (1968).
27. See Goldman, supra note 22, at 653.
28. See id at 653-54; Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at
1146, 1147 (a student "will almost certainly have insufficient bargaining power to obtain any
other terms than those the school chooses to dictate"); Note, The Scope of University Disci-
pline, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 486, 488 (1969); Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or
Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 277, 281 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330 (Ist Cir. 1976); Giles v. Howard
Univ., 428 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1977); Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.I. 1976).
30. See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
31. Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769-70, 99 Cal. Rptr.
531, 535 (1972) (quoting CAL. JUR. 2d Universities and Colleges § 58, at 505 (1959)).
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dismissed student.32 The contract doctrine may also afford increased ben-
efits to a student when a university violates its own procedures made a part
of the contract. One court reinstated a grade of "Incomplete," rather than
the "Failure" designated by the dean, following a finding that the dean
was not authorized under the school's "grade appeal process" to substitute
a grade for one recommended by the grade appeal committee, which had
awarded an "Incomplete." 3 Additionally, if the contract theory is em-
ployed, one commentator has observed that a proper application of con-
tract law would place the burden of proof on the university when it
terminates the contract by dismissal for a student's breach.34 Placing the
burden on the school has not been the practice, however, as most courts
require the student to show that the school has acted arbitrarily in a dis-
missal.35 Furthermore, it might be argued that contractual principles of
reasonableness require a court to imply a contract term that the university
will operate in a reasonable and fair manner in any disciplinary proceed-
ing.36 Thus, the prevailing contract doctrine of student-university relations
could be applied to afford some protection against a school's arbitrary dis-
missal of students.
II. DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON STUDENT DISCIPLINE
A. Emergence of Constitutional Due Process Considerations
Until 1961, attempts to secure judicial review of student dismissals as
violative of constitutional due process were unsuccessful.37 Judicial review
was denied on the ground that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over stu-
dent claims of unjust treatment by universities. It was said: "Education is
a field of life reserved to the individual states. The only restriction the
Federal Government imposes is that in their educational program no state
may discriminate against an individual because of race, color or creed."38
Even if a federal court had jurisdiction over such a claim, it was the perva-
sive view that a student was admitted to a college "not as a matter of right
but as a matter of grace after having agreed to conform to its rules and
regulations."39 This view found support in the Supreme Court's character-
32. Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850
(1976); Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125, 127 (1932).
33. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354, 1358-63 (D.R.I. 1976).
34. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 1146.
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir.) (a student must
adduce evidence of a violated contractual right), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
36. If it can be implied into the university-student contract that the student will not be
arbitrarily expelled, it follows that it can be implied there must be a fair proceeding to
determine if expulsion is warranted. Otherwise, a student could be arbitrarily expelled. See
note 31 supra and accompanying text.
37. As of 1959, no court had ordered reinstatement for a student expelled or suspended
from college. See Byse, Procedure in Student Dismissal Proceedings. Law & Policy, STU-
DENT PERSONNEL, Mar. 1963, at 131-36.
38. Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 966 (1960).
39. Id at 20.
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ization of attendance at a state university as a mere "privilege."4 If col-
lege attendance was a privilege and not a right, as the Court reasoned,
there was no constitutional protection in school discipline proceedings and
thus no requirement of constitutional due process prior to expulsion.4'
An abrupt departure from this settled rule came in 1961 when the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion42 that the expulsion for misconduct of six students from a state college
without notice and some opportunity for a hearing on the reasons for the
dismissals violated the due process clause of the Constitution.43 Even if
attending a public university is only a privilege rather than a right, the
court observed: "[I]t nonetheless remains true that the State cannot condi-
tion the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitu-
tional right to procedural due process." 44 The court reasoned that
"[w]henever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, ,the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process. ' 45 The
"right to remain at the college . . . is an interest of extremely great
value' 46 that, absent "immediate danger to the public," cannot be denied
by the school without "exercising at least the fundamental principles of
fairness by giving the accused students notice of the charges and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in their own defense., 47 The Dixon court held that
prior to a disciplinary expulsion of students from a state university, "notice
and some opportunity for hearing" are constitutionally mandated by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.48
Dixon was not an aberration. Its rationale has been followed in a series
of cases involving expulsions and suspensions from public universities and
secondary schools.4 9 Yet Dixon has not turned the federal courts into "wet
nurses or baby sitters" for the nation's students, as feared by the dissenters
in Dixon.," The Dixon court observed that a "full-dress judicial hear-
ing" 5 was not necessary; the procedure could "vary depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case" 52 so long as "the rudiments of an
40. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261 (1934).
41. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala.
1960).
42. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
43. The misconduct for which the students were expelled was not specified, although it
concerned the dismissed students' involvement in off-campus civil-rights demonstrations.
The notice of expulsion assigned no specific ground for expulsion. Id at 151 n.2.
44. Id at 156.
45. Id at 155.
46. Id at 157.
47. Id
48. Id at 158.
49. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975), for a collection of federal court
decisions that uniformly hold the due process clause applicable to decisions made by public
educational institutions for student expulsion or suspension. For state court decisions to the
same effect, see North v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977); De
Prima v. Columbia-Greene Community College, 89 Misc. 2d 620, 392 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1977).
50. 294 F.2d at 160 (dissenting opinion).
51. Id at 159.
52. Id. at 158.
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adversary proceeding" are provided.53 In adopting the Dixon rationale,
other courts have approved a variety of procedures deemed adequate to
insure "fairness and reasonableness" in student disciplinary matters.54
Any lingering doubt as to the accuracy of the Dixon rationale and the
scope of its application was removed in 1975 when the Supreme Court
addressed the issue in Goss v. Lopez." The Court held that the discipli-
nary suspensions of nine students from a public high school for up to ten
days without a hearing violated the due process clause. With Goss, the
Supreme Court finally ended any notion of a public school's autonomy
and immunity from due process considerations when it interrupts the at-
tendance of a student, whether for a short or long period of time.56 The
Court reasoned that while there is "no constitutional right to an education
at public expense," property interests protected by the due process clause
are normally not creatures of the Constitution, but rather are established
by other sources such as state statutes and rules.5 7 Thus, while state em-
ployees,58 welfare recipients,59 and parolees6" have no constitutional right
to their status, they have "legitimate claims of entitlement" which trigger
due process protection before such status can be terminated. 6 If a state
affords certain benefits, it may not divest them without affording constitu-
tional due process.62
The due process clause protects property and liberty, both of which, ac-
cording to Goss, are threatened in school expulsions. The state must "rec-
ognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a
property interest."63 Likewise, students' liberty interests are at stake in
"charges of misconduct" that "could seriously damage the students' stand-
ing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment."'  Thus, the Court
held:
the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a triv-
ial period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious
event in the life of the suspended child. Neither the property interest
in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in
reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspen-
53. Id at 159.
54. See, e.g., Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972); Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 402
(N.D. Fla. 1963) (telephoned notice was appropriate). As to what are fair and reasonable
procedures in student dismissal cases, see notes 75-109 infra and accompanying text.
55. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
56. Id at 584.
57. Id at 572.
58. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
59. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
60. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
61. 419 U.S. at 573.
62. "Having chosen to extend the right to an education... [the State] may not with-
draw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to deter-
mine whether the misconduct has occurred." Id at 574.
63. Id
64. Id at 575 (footnote omitted).
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sions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school
chooses, no matter how arbitrary.65
B. What Process Is Due Under the Constitution
Dixon, Goss, and their progeny66 establish that a public educational in-
stitution must comply with the due process clause when it attempts to ex-
clude its students from the educational process. Once it is determined that
due process applies, however, the question remains of what process is due.
Dixon recommended the "rudiments of an adversary proceeding," and re-
quired both notice with a statement of specific charges and a hearing con-
taining procedural safeguards greater than those of an informal
interview.67 Goss also spoke of "rudimentary precautions" in requiring
oral or written notice of the charges with an explanation of the evidence
and an opportunity for the student to present his side of the story.6" Be-
yond these minimal requirements, apparently the circumstances of each
case will determine the procedures necessary to insure fairness, since "the
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation."69 Although "notice
and hearing should precede removal,"7 there may be situations where im-
mediate removal from school is necessary. In such an event the notice and
hearing should follow as soon as practicable.7" In its discussion of brief
suspensions, the Court stopped short of construing due process to require
that a student must have "the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own wit-
nesses to verify his version of the incident."7" But the Court emphasized
that the minimal procedures applied only to short suspensions of not more
than ten days, and stated that "[1]onger suspensions or expulsions. . . may
require more formal procedures."73 Furthermore, there may be "unusual
situations" involving short suspensions in which "something more than the
rudimentary procedures will be required."74
Given this flexible guide and a reluctance to impose the full trial proce-
dure on educational administrators, the courts have been inclined to ap-
prove of disciplinary proceedings lacking some of the standard features
65. Id. at 576 (footnote omitted).
66. For a collection of federal cases applying due process to dismissals of students from
state colleges, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975).
67. 294 F.2d at 159.
68. 419 U.S. at 581. Truncated trial-type procedures in each case are not necessary or
desirable so long as there is a "meaningful hedge against erroneous action" that alerts the
disciplinarian to any dispute about facts and arguments about cause and effect. Id at 583-
84. For example, contrary to the criminal or civil trial pattern, the Court states there need be
no delay between the time notice is given and the hearing. Id at 582.
69. 419 U.S. at 578 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
70. 419 U.S. at 582.
71. Id at 582-83. "Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately re-
moved from school." Id at 582.
72. Id at 583.




associated with judicial proceedings. Clearly, "procedures for dismissing
college students [are] not analogous to criminal proceedings. ' 75 Adequate
notice is a fundamental requirement, and more serious cases require suffi-
cient time to prepare for a hearing.76 A notice should contain a statement
of the specific charges and the grounds that, if proven, would justify expul-
sion under the applicable regulations of the school." A notice may be
constitutionally defective if it does not contain adequate information such
as the date of the misconduct charged.78 Many courts have held that the
presence of counsel is not a sine qua non of a fair hearing;79 others have
indicated, however, that the denial of a request for presence of counsel
may render the proceeding invalid."0 The right of the student to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him has been held necessary by
some courts81 and not essential by others.8 2 While confrontation may not
be essential, it may be a reliable indicator of the overall fairness of the
proceedings.83 There is general agreement that a student must be allowed
to present oral or written evidence on his behalf, including his own testi-
mony and that of his witnesses. 84 In presenting his case, however, the stu-
dent may not exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. 85 Formal
rules of evidence need not be followed,86 and hearsay evidence is allowa-
ble,87 but a disciplinary decision must be based only on the evidence
presented at the hearing, and that evidence must be "substantial., 88 While
75. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473
(1967).
76. See, e.g., Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
77. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473
(1967).
78. Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
79. See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 286 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Haynes v. Dallas County Junior College Dist., 386 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
Tex. 1974).
80. See, e.g., North v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 417 (W. Va. 1977).
81. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967);
De Prima v. Columbia-Greene Community College, 89 Misc. 2d 620, 392 N.Y.S.2d 348, 350
(Sup. Ct. 1977).
82. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967).
83. See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968);
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968).
84. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), af§'d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
85. See Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1969). But see State
ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942).
86. See Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 883, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 475 (1967). The court in Goldberg concluded that a state college in a student dismissal
proceeding need not follow the rules of evidence usually applicable in judicial proceedings.
Likewise, a hearing body in a dismissal proceeding may consider hearsay evidence, need not
recognize the privilege against self-incrimination, and need not recognize a rule that a per-
son subject to university discipline can refuse to answer questions under any and all circum-
stances.
87. See, e.g., id; Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
88. Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 171 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Esteban v. Cen-
tral Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
1979]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
a student has no right to an open hearing,89 a closed hearing must comply
with due process.9" There is no constitutional requirement as to the com-
position of the hearing board,9' and charges of adjudicatory bias have so
far been unsuccessful.92 There is, however, agreement that a student is
entitled to an impartial tribunal.9 3 Such impartiality is doubtful if the sole
disciplinarian is also the complaining witness in a suspension proceed-
ing.94 As to a record of the proceeding, due process does not require that a
stenographic or mechanical recording be made,9" but the school or student
may record at their own expense. 96 The decision of a hearing board, how-
ever, must be written,97 public, and available for student inspection.98 The
punishment imposed, assuming the proceedings have been fair, is within
the discretion of the school99 and not subject to judicial review unless there
is a shocking disparity between the offense and the penalty."°° Although
the decisions have been assailed by commentators,"° courts have found no
due process prohibition to a school's imposition of sanctions for student
violations of local or state law even if there is also prosecution for a public
offense. 10
2
89. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 768 (W.D. La. 1968).
90. In Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), the court
said that a full-dress judicial hearing, "with the attending publicity ... might be detrimen-
tal to the college's educational atmosphere and [thus] impractical to carry out. Nevertheless,
the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved .... " A closed hearing may
be necessary under state statutes protecting the privacy of students' files and records. Mar-
ston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). If the hearing
body is the faculty, however, it might be argued that under some state "open public meet-
ing" acts a disciplinary hearing must be open to the public. Cf Cathcart v. Anderson, 85
Wash. 2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975) (law school faculty meetings are subject to state open
meetings act).
91. See Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975); Project,
Procedural Due Process, and Campus Disorder." A Comparison of Law and Practice, 1970
DUKE L.J. 763, 781.
92. See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 883, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475
(1967).
93. Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382
F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1080 (1969). But see Beattie v. Roberts, 436 F.2d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1971).
94. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). See
generally Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975); Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
95. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
96. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
97. Id at 652.
98. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); Woody v.
Bums, 188 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
99. Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1974) (disciplinary
findings and punishment "when reached by correct procedures" will be upheld unless
"clearly unreasonable"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); see Comette v. Aldridge, 408
S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, mand. overr.).
100. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974).
101. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4; Wright, supra note 93, at 1068-69.
102. See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Colo. 1968); Due v. Florida A. &
M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Fla. 1963). Professor Wright has recognized the force
of the arguments advanced by Professor Van Alstyne that
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Claims have also been made for due process protections that are some-
what beyond the minimal notice and hearing guarantee. Arguments that
the Constitution requires a written code specifying what acts are sanction-
able have not been successful. 103 It has been held, however, that a general
prohibition of "misconduct" without more specification is unconstitution-
ally vague as a basis for expulsions or suspensions for a significant pe-
riod."° Furthermore, if a school sets forth a code or procedure, it would
constitute a due process violation for the school to depart therefrom to any
significant degree.105 The question of whether due process and the fourth
amendment afford protection against warrantless searches of dormitory
rooms by school officials is in dispute."0 6 The exclusionary rule, however,
has been held not to apply in student disciplinary proceedings, even when
the search is concededly unlawful."0 7 Claims of protection from double
jeopardy have been rejected where the challenged second prosecution is by
the state after a disciplinary proceeding. 0 8 Summary discipline, where
immediate dismissals are ordered with hearings to follow, has been limited
to emergency situations in which the safety of students or others is
threatened. 109
due process prohibits the university from enforcing any regulation that is not
related to the legitimate business of the university or that punishment at the
university for conduct that does not abuse any privilege extended by the uni-
versity is so arbitrary as to be a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Wright, supra note 93, at 1069 (footnotes omitted).
103. In Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968), the court said: "'The Uni-
versity is not required to provide a negative type of behavioral code typical of criminal
laws.'" Id at 284 (quoting a statement by the administrative council of the university). See
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 146 (W.D.
Mo. 1968) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as General Order] (a school need not establish a code
of student conduct). But see Wright, supra note 93, at 1060-67 (code of student conduct
should be established); Note, A University May Properly Dismiss Students Whose Conduct
Disrupts the Educational Atmosphere of the University if It Grants the Students the Basic Ele-
ments of Procedural Due Process-Notfication and a Hearing on the Charges, 5 Hous. L.
REV. 541, 547-48 (1968) (suggests that substantive due process requires promulgation of a
code of conduct).
104. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
105. Escobar v. State Univ. of N.Y./College at Old Westbury, 427 F. Supp. 850, 858
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
106. See State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121 (1976); Delgado, College
Search and Seizures.- Students, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 57
(1974); Comment, Public Universities and Due Process of Law.- Students' Protection Against
Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 512 (1969); Note, The Relationship of
the Fourth Amendment to Student Disciplinary Hearings, 30 U. PITr. L. REV. 561 (1969). In
Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968), the court upheld a
dormitory room search by school officials and police without benefit of warrant stating: "A
Student who lives in a dormitory on campus which he 'rents' from the school waives objec-
tions to any reasonable searches conducted pursuant to reasonable and necessary regulations
107. Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (D.N.H. 1976); Moore v. Student Affairs
Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 727 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
108. See McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DEN. L.J. 558, 564 (1968); General
Order, supra note 103, at 147.
109. Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Wis. 1969). Even
though an immediate suspension appears warranted, it must be preceded by a preliminary
hearing to determine if the facts justified summary suspension. Id at 420.
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From this brief survey of what minimal procedures satisfy due proc-
ess," ' it is obvious that the standard features of judicial procedure have
not been required for student dismissals from state schools. Aside from
notice and a hearing opportunity, there appears to be no agreement on the
precise procedures necessary, so long as the process employed was fair
under the circumstances. Thus, while a dismissal of a student is review-
able for due process compliance, the courts do not view the fourteenth
amendment as dictating a certain body of procedures that a school must
employ.
C. Limitations on Constitutional Due Process
Even the minimal due process standards are not applied to all student
discipline. The full extension of due process protection in student discipli-
nary proceedings and dismissals is limited by three factors. First, some
courts consider due process procedures unnecessary in school disciplinary
proceedings that do not result in suspension or dismissal. Secondly, the
courts have not extended due process rights to students in private schools.
Thirdly, due process for academic dismissals is of a greatly diluted variety.
Nonexciusion Discpline. There is authority for the view that due process
procedures of notice and hearing are required only in school proceedings
that result in suspension, expulsion, or some kind of dismissal from attend-
ance at the institution."' Other types of disciplinary matters need not be
attended with such procedures as notice and hearing. There is no constitu-
tional mandate for "such procedures before corporal or other minor pun-
ishment is applied to a student.""' 2 Exponents of this view rely upon
Ingraham v. Wright,' 13 in which the Supreme Court held that due process
did "not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal
punishment in the public schools." ''
The Court in Ingraham stated that when state school authorities "punish
a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable
physical pain . . . Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are impli-
cated.""' 5 The Court, however, reasoned that the infliction of reasonable
corporal punishment was a common law privilege, and, because of the
availability of adequate traditional remedies for abuse of the privilege,
"the case for administrative safeguards is significantly less compelling."
116
110. In connection with what process is due, it should be noted that the denial of due
process rights to students suspended for misconduct would be actionable for damages. In
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court held that even when student suspensions
were justified, the denial of a hearing prior to suspension from a public school, absent proof
of actual damages, entitles the suspended students to nominal damages.
111. Home v. Cox, 551 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1977).
112. Id at 692.
113. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
114. Id. at 682. Another proposition decided was that corporal punishment did not con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. Id at 671.
115. Id at 674 (footnote omitted).
116. Id at 679 (footnote omitted).
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While the Court did not exclude corporal punishment from due process
protection, it found the particular procedures of notice and hearing unnec-
essary since the risk of violating a child's substantive rights was regarded
as minimal." 7 Thus, while more sophisticated procedures may not be
warranted as a matter of course for minor punishments, due process is
applicable when a public educational institution "imposes a mild, as well
as a severe, penalty upon a student.""'
With regard to public institutions of higher education, it appears that
any discipline involving exclusion from the educational process can be
tested by due process guidelines. Exclusion from the educational process
would seem to include removal from a class or course as well as removal
from the institution's auxiliary services such as a library or dormitory." 9
Minor discipline, such as the removal of a student from a one-hour class
session, may not trigger the necessity of an adversary proceeding, but due
process would be a guide to insure a fair and reliable determination by the
disciplinarian.
Private Schools. Students at private educational institutions are not af-
forded due process protection in dismissals or disciplinary matters because
such institutions are not considered governmental agencies or instrumen-
talities.'2 ° The fourteenth amendment provides that "[no] state [shall] de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
but absent state action, due process is not applicable.' 2'
While the denial of due process protection for student disciplinary mat-
ters in private schools has been the prevailing view of the courts, 122 it has
been subjected to criticism as both logically indefensible and an unwar-
117. Id at 682.
118. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. See Escobar v. State Univ. of N.Y./College at Old Westbury, 427 F. Supp. 850
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (court ordered plaintiff reinstated to dormitory room).
120. Actions of colleges and universities not operated by the state or funded by state
monies, and which do not hold themselves out as state universities, have been held not to be
actions of the state. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. The fourteenth amendment requires due process only for deprivations of property
which are attributable to "state action." See Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Since "property" has been interpreted to include the right to attend college and be free from
illegal exclusions, public schools and state colleges come under the state action doctrine.
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.) (public high
school), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968).
122. See, e.g., Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971); Bright v. Isenbarger, 445
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Browns v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Braden v.
University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Brownley v. Gettysburg College,
338 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Rowe v. Chandler, 332 F. Supp. 336 (D. Kan. 1971);
McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970); Counts v. Vorhees College,
312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S.C. 1970); Torres v. Puerto Rico Jr. College, 298 F. Supp. 458 (D.P.R.
1969); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greene v.
Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), drmissed as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
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ranted reading of the state action principle.' 23 It is argued that the disci-
plinary proceedings of a private university involve a degree of state action
sufficient to invoke the due process clause, owing to the expansion of the
state action doctrine and the degree of governmental involvement in pri-
vate education. "While the principle that private action is immune from
the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment is well established and easily
stated, the question whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the one
hand, or 'state action,' on the other, frequently admits of no easy an-
swer."124 Such privately owned and operated enterprises as a company-
owned town, 125 a street car and bus company, 26 and a political party 27
have been subjected to due process application upon findings that they
were affected with public functions. In the same vein, a racially discrimi-
natory admissions policy of a private school has been held to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. z28 As one court ob-
served: "one may question whether any school or college can ever be so
'private' as to escape the reach of the fourteenth amendment."'' 29 It was
reasoned that a private institution need not be regarded as an agency or
instrumentality of the state for there to be "state action." Recognition of
state action for purposes of due process protection is not the equivalent of
finding governmental control and domination.
There are several approaches to the question of whether state action is
involved. 3 ° One approach is to weigh the degree of governmental in-
volvement in private education. Government financial aid to private uni-
versities, both direct and indirect, has become commonplace. 3 ' Direct
financial aid is found in scholarships, student loans, government work-
123. See Keller & Meskill, Student Rights and Due Process, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 389 (1974);
O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 166-67 (1970); Note,
The College Student and Due Process in Discllinary Proceedings, 13 S.D. L. REV. 87, 90
(1968); Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 438, 439 (1962).
124. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974).
125. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
126. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
127. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See generally Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La.) ("[P]rivate ownership or operation of a
facility impressed with a public interest does not automatically insulate it from the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment."), rev'dper curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
128. See Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania
v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
129. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. La.), rev'd
per curtam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
130. An interesting summary and critique of various approaches to the question of state
action is contained in Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
where the court identified five different approaches: contact counting or interest analysis;
ascertaining and balancing the constitutional interests involved; the public function theory
of state action; state regulation in the challenged activity; and the general extent of govern-
ment control over the actions of the organization, such as financing and regulation.
131. For a case finding state action where a state provided financial aid to a private
school, see Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). But see Grossner
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (receipt of state
money-30% of school budget-is alone not enough to make recipient a governmental
agency). While direct financial aid has proved to be an important factor in finding state
action, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975), the court in Winsey v.
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study programs, and research grants.'32 Indirect financial aid is found in
tax-exempt status, the loan of public land or facilities, the power of emi-
nent domain, and building programs underwritten with governmental
loans.' 33 Aside from fiscal involvement, there is governmental regulation
of private universities in state authorization to grant degrees, state accred-
iting, and state-issued charters.' 34 Additionally, some private universities
have governing boards with members designated by the state. 135 The mo-
tivation for these government benefits to private education and the degree
of involvement are cited as bases for a finding of state action; namely,
private education is fulfilling a public function.'36 The Supreme Court has
observed that "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments." '137 Given the importance of education to a de-
mocracy, it is clear that the "administrators of a private college are per-
forming a public function."' 38 Partly for this reason, it has been suggested
that private universities should be considered and treated as public utili-
ties. ' 39
State action may also be found in the very nature of modern campus
life. The great power of the university over its students means that it is
functionally a government analogous to a company-owned town exercising
quasi-governmental powers.' 4 ° No one of these factors may persuade a
court that state action is present, but the cumulative impact of these indica-
tors of state involvement and public function may lead to a judicial re-
evaluation of the applicability of the due process clause to student discipli-
nary proceedings at private universities. 14 1
Despite these appealing arguments for extending fourteenth amendment
protection to actions by private colleges or professional schools, courts
have generally been unwilling to interfere with nonstate school discipli-
nary processes by holding these to be state action.' 42 This reluctance also
Pace College, 394 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), declared that the amount of government
funding is immaterial unless it can be shown to have caused the alleged injury.
132. See Comment, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universi-
ties, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 277, 290 (1969).
133. Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969) (special tax exemption for
University of Denver, a private school); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1965) (donation of city or state property to private college). See generally O'Neil,
supra note 123, at 181-84.
134. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1615 (1960) (state requirements for degree); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:411 (West Supp. 1979) (state authorization to award degrees); T.
BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW 25 (1961) (state issued charter).
135. See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 863-64 (E.D.
La.), rev'dper curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962); T. BLACKWELL, supra note 134, at 55.
136. See O'Neil, supra note 123.
137. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
138. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La.), rev'd
per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
139. See Corson, Social Change and the University, 53 SAT. REV., Jan. 10, 1970, at 76.
140. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); O'Neil, supra note 123, at 184.
141. Project, supra note 4, at 800-01 (the indicia or cumulative approach).
142. See, e.g., Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976); Browns v. Mitch-
ell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Furumoto v.
Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598
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appears to be present in cases involving discipline for academic deficien-
cies. 14 3 Courts may be more willing to find state action where racial dis-
crimination is involved because of the peculiarly offensive nature of such
conduct.'" Thus, absent racial discrimination, the prospect is weak for
courts' requiring constitutional due process protection in student discipline
processes in nonstate schools.
45
Academic Discpline. Dismissals for failure to meet academic standards,
although certainly an interruption or termination of the educational expe-
rience, are not subject to the same kind of due process protection that is
occasioned by dismissals or suspensions for misconduct. 46 The Supreme
Court addressed the question of what procedural due process is necessary
for an academic dismissal from a state medical school in the recent case of
Board of Curators v. Horowitz.'4 7 The Court assumed the existence of a
liberty or property interest necessary for entitlement to procedural protec-
tion under the fourteenth amendment, and concluded that the procedure
was sufficient if the student had been fully informed of faculty dissatisfac-
tion with her progress and the dangers that this posed to a timely gradua-
tion and continued enrollment. 48 The ultimate dismissal of Horowitz was
preceded by a multistage process characterized by notice of the grounds
for dissatisfaction and adequate opportunity to answer the claimed defi-
ciency."'9 The Justices were all in agreement that Horowitz "received all
the procedural process that was due her under the fourteenth amend-
(D.S.C. 1970), aff'dmem., 439 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1971); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
143. See Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
144. See, e.g., Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.) (with
possible exception of racial discrimination, mere financial support constitutes insufficient
state involvement to trigger constitutional guaranties), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975);
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73
(2d Cir. 1968). Furthermore, if racial discimination qualifies as "a badge of slavery," it may
be invalid under the thirteenth amendment without a showing of state action.
145. In holding that a private club was not engaged in state action when it refused service
to a black person, the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
stated that for state action to be present the state must have "significantly involved itself'
with the conduct in question. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974),
involving a public utility's allegedly improper termination of service to a customer, the
Supreme Court stated that there must be "a sufficiently close nexus" between the state and
the challenged activity in order to find state action. Thus, it seems unlikely that the impetus
for extension of the state action concept to include private school disciplinary processes will
come from recent Supreme Court decisions.
146. For a compelling argument that students have constitutionally protected liberty and
property interests in their public education, which warrant notice and hearing prior to the
deprivation of these interests for academic reasons, see Dessem, Student Due Process Rights
in Academic Dismissals from the Public Schools, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 277 (1976).
147. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
148. Id at 85.
149. The student, Horowitz, began her final year of medical school on probation. There-
after, the Council of Evaluation, a faculty-student group that assessed academic perform-
ance, considered continued reports of dissatisfaction and concluded that she not be
considered for graduation that year and absent radical improvement that she be dropped as
a student. As an "appeal," she was allowed to take examinations evaluated by seven physi-
cians, of which only two recommended her graduation. The council thereupon reaffirmed
its decision. After subsequent negative performance ratings, the council recommended she
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ment."' 50 The concurring and dissenting Justices, however, were unable to
accept the majority's opinion to the extent it "conclude[d] that no hearing
of any kind or any opportunity to respond [was] required" prior to dismis-
sal for academic reasons. 5'
According to the Horowitz majority, "[a]ll that Goss required was an
'informal give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body
dismissing him that would, at least, give the student 'the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper con-
text.' " 52 The very nature of due process, the Court observed, requires
flexibility and "the significant difference between the failure of a student to
meet academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of
conduct" is a difference that "calls for far less stringent procedural require-
ments in the case of an academic dismissal." '153 This difference had been
recognized in a series of state and federal decisions holding that "formal
hearings" need not be held in the case of academic dismissals. 154 The ra-
tionale for this difference, according to Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the
majority, is rooted in the historic idea that "'[a] public hearing may be
.. . useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to scholarship.' 155 The
harmfulness of a hearing for an academic dismissal was not detailed by the
Court other than to observe the different nature of an academic and a mis-
conduct dismissal. Suspensions for disciplinary reasons have a "sufficient
resemblance to traditional judicial and administrative factfinding to call
for a 'hearing.' "156 Academic evaluations of a student, however, bear lit-
tle resemblance to the judicial and administrative factfinding proceedings
since the academic judgment is more subjective and the expert evaluation
required is "not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or ad-
ministrative decisionmaking."' 57 The majority opinion stressed that the
educational process is not by its nature adversarial and that the introduc-
tion of adversary hearings for misconduct suspensions and dismissals is
justified only because "disciplinary proceedings . . . may automatically
bring an adversarial flavor to the normal student-teacher relationship."' 58
This automatic adversarial flavor does not follow in the academic context,
according to Justice Rehnquist, and thus the majority "decline[d] to fur-
be dropped as a student. The faculty coordinating committee and the dean approved.
Horowitz appealed to the provost who, after review, sustained the decision. See id at 80-82.
150. Id at 108-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id at 96 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that Horowitz had been
awarded at least as much due process as the fourteenth amendment requires, but "I cannot
join the Court's opinion, however, because it contains dictum suggesting that respondent
was entitled to even less procedural protection than she received." 1d at 97 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id at 85-86. It is somewhat interesting that three of the Justices constituting the
majority in Horowitz dissented in Goss.
153. Id at 86.
154. Id at 88.
155. Id at 87 (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095
(1913)).
156. Id at 88-89.
157. Id at 90.
158. Id
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ther enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby
risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student rela-
tionship."' 59 According to the majority, public education "'is committed
to the control of state and local authorities' "160 and thus there is no reason
for "judicial interposition" in "that historic control."''
The Horowitz decision does not, however, exempt academic dismissals
from due process protection. Dismissal of a student from a public educa-
tional institution for failure to comply with academic standards is a depri-
vation within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. This concept
was expressly assumed in Horowitz by all of the Justices. 162 Furthermore,
the Horowitz majority did not disturb the holding in Goss that "the state is
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public edu-
cation as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process
Clause."' 163 The majority opinion in Horowitz also cited with approval a
circuit court of appeals decision that held that an exclusion from a public
university for failure to comply with academic standards is within the pro-
tection of the due process clause, although requiring different procedural
protections than a misconduct dismissal."6
The question of what process is due becomes especially interesting in
light of the majority's footnote passage: "We conclude that considering all
relevant factors . . . a hearing is not required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 65 The language "a hearing is not re-
quired" would seem to reject informal as well as formal hearings. The
majority opinion does not offer express guidance beyond this point. There
are, however, some suggestions (albeit indirect) in the opinion as to the
nature of the due process protection available.
The Horowitz majority cited with approval Greenhill v. Bailey,166 in
which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a hearing was neces-
sary when a medical school not only dismissed a student for academic rea-
sons, but also sent a letter to the Association of American Medical
Colleges commenting that the student either lacked intellectual ability or
had insufficiently prepared his course work. According to the Horowitz
majority: "The publicization of an alleged deficiency in the student's intel-
lectual ability removed the case from the typical instance of academic dis-
159. Id At the point when a student is about to be dismissed from school, one might
question how a hearing would risk deterioration of the student-faculty relationship that
would otherwise be summarily terminated. Indeed, it may well be that the general student-
faculty relationship would be improved through increased student respect for a faculty will-
ing to allow a student an opportunity to be heard before dismissal for academic reasons.
160. Id at 91 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
161. Id
162. Id at 84-85, 96 (Powell, J., concurring), 97 (White, J., concurring), 97 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 108-09 (Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
163. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
164. 435 U.S. at 87-88 (citing Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975)).
165. 435 U.S. at 86 n.3.
166. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
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missal and called for greater procedural protections."'' 67 As an analogous
authority supportive of Greenhill, the Court cited its holding in Bishop v.
Wood, ' 68 which upheld the dismissal of a public employee without a hear-
ing "when there [was] no public disclosure of the reasons for the dis-
charge."''69 The Court also cited with approval Gaspar v. Bruton. 71
Bruton held that school authorities dismissing a student for deficiencies in
meeting minimum academic performance "need only advise the student
with respect to such deficiencies in any form" so that the student will be
made aware, prior to his dismissal, of his failure to meet those stan-
dards. ' 7'
To generalize, an academic dismissal from a public school does not re-
quire a prior hearing to satisfy due process unless some publication of the
alleged deficiency will stigmatize the student, provided that the school au-
thorities, prior to dismissal, advise the student of the alleged deficiency in
some form adequate to apprise him of the reasons for the dismissal. If
notice is to be a meaningful procedure, a student should then have the
opportunity to respond, for example, to show mitigating factors or to chal-
lenge an exclusion he thinks mistaken. ,72 Aside from this minimal notice-
and-response requirement, however, judicial review is unavailable for a
suspension or dismissal for academic reasons when there is "no showing of
arbitrariness or capriciousness,"'' 73 ill will, or bad motive.' 74
D. Common Law Due Process Rights
Aside from the constitutional due process required by the fourteenth
amendment, an alternative analysis of the university-student relationship
compares it to private, voluntary associations that are subject to a common
law cause of action for arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith exclusions or
expulsions. This approach may provide some benefits to students at pri-
vate universities and schools, which are not subject to due process require-
ments under the fourteenth amendment. Although courts in general have
been reluctant to act upon claims of unwarranted exclusion from member-
ship in professional or honorary societies,' 75 there is "a judicially enforcea-
ble right to have [a membership] application considered in a manner
comporting with the fundamentals of due process, including the, showing
of cause for rejection." 176 Such a judicially enforceable right would apply
167. 435 U.S. at 88 n.5.
168. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
169. Id at 348.
170. 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
171. Id at 851.
172. This "response opportunity" is not expressly required in the decisions considered
herein.
173. 435 U.S. at 92.
174. Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Greenhill v. Bailey,
378 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D. Iowa 1974); 1976 Y.B. SCH. L. 305 (P. Piele ed.).
175. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963).
176. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 166, 460 P.2d 495,
499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969).
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to memberships in voluntary associations that have some effect upon the
applicant's professional or economic success, or when the association has a
professional or economic interest.' 7 The rationale underlying this cause
of action is a "recognition by the courts of the increasing effect that private
and voluntary organizations have on the individual's ability and access to
the economic marketplace and his opportunities to earn a living or practice
his trade or profession."'78 Thus, for example, a union membership appli-
cation must be acted upon in a manner comporting with due process, sub-
ject to judicial review, since the union's "asserted right to choose its own
members does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamen-
tal right to work for a living."'179
It follows that if factors are present which subject a membership appli-
cation in a private association to judicial review for common law due proc-
ess compliance, the expulsion of a member from such an association would
likewise be subject to the same judicial standard. Indeed, at English com-
mon law a member of a private association was protected against expul-
sions that were contrary to "natural justice."'80 The American analogue
for natural justice is due process, and American courts have intervened to
guarantee procedural rights against expulsion to members of private as-
sociations if the procedural rules of the association were contrary to due
process,' s" or if the actions taken were ultra vires, 8 2 or in bad faith:'8 3
The legal principle is a general one affecting all proceedings which
may result in loss of property, position or character, or any disaster to
another; that he shall be first heard by the board or tribunal consider-
ing his case before that body will be legally permitted to pronounce
his condemnation.18 4
This principle has been applied to expulsion proceedings of such private
177. Id; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 732, 155 P.2d 329, 335-36 (1944);
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 592, 170 A.2d 791, 797 (1961).
178. Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal, App. 3d 935, 940, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1970).
179. James v, Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
180. See Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (C.A. 1881); Pett v. Greyhound Racing
Ass'n, I Q.B. 125 (C.A. 1969); Morris, The Court and Domestic Tribunals, 69 LAW Q. REV.
318, 323 (1953).
181. See, e.g., Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 143, 231 P.2d 6, 10-11
(1951) (en banc) (expulsion proceedings of private associations must not be malicious, con-
trary to the rules of the association, or contrary to natural justice; fair trial guaranteed); Swit
v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677, 680, 254 P.2d 587, 588-89 (1953) (due process
guarantees of notice, hearing, and a fair trial in expulsion imposed even if not in the rules of
the association); Hawkins v. Obremski, 33 Misc. 2d 1009, 1011, 227 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
182. See, e.g., Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711
(1944) (expulsion conclusive on civil court if association gave notice and hearing, conducted
in accordance with its rules); Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 265, 120
P.2d 874, 875 (1942) (function of court in reviewing expulsion from private association is to
determine whether association acted within its powers in good faith, in accordance with its
laws and the laws of the land).
183. See, e.g., Junkins v. Local 6313, Communication Workers, 241 Mo. App. 1029, 271
S.W.2d 71 (1954) (expulsion proceedings not conducted fairly or honestly; bias was shown).
184. Loubat v. Le Roy, 47 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 546, 551 (1886). See generally Developments in




associations as unions, 8 5 social clubs, 8 6 medical associations,187 and
churches. 188
It can be argued that the university resembles such a private association,
in that admission thereto and continuation therein have significant profes-
sional and economic consequences to the student. If the student-university
relationship may be characterized in such terms, students at private col-
leges and professional schools would then have a common law right to due
process before being excluded. 89 Under this theory the status of a student
has the nature of a property right protected by the common law.' 90 Status
as a student in a university entails a reasonable expectation of receiving a
degree, an expectation of considerable economic consequence. Expulsion
from a university, especially insofar as it makes admission to other univer-
sities difficult, if not impossible, denies a student access to a large number
of occupations and professions. At the very least, it permanently mars the
student's record, making competition for graduate school and jobs more
difficult.' 9 1 Exclusions from a professional school, such as law or
medicine, effectively preclude the admission to that profession. In addi-
tion to the economic loss, the status of a student is deemed by society to be
inherently worthwhile. The prevailing social ethic recognizes the intrinsic
value of education quite apart from the economic value, which is evi-
denced in public attitudes and public aid to education. The common law
has protected associational interests when they are perceived as being suffi-
ciently important to economic potential or deemed inherently worthwhile
by the prevailing social ethic.'9 2 Thus, it can be argued that the student-
university relationship is subject to common law due process constraints in
an expulsion process.
One flaw in this analysis is that it tends to give rise to a presumption
185. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945); Junkins v.
Local 6313, Communication Workers, 241 Mo. App. 1029, 271 S.W.2d 71 (1954).
186. See Brooks v. Petroleum Club, 207 Kan. 277, 484 P.2d 1026 (1971); Spiegelman v.
Engineers Country Club, 38 A.D.2d 728, 329 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1972).
187. See Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961);
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1969) (en banc).
188. See Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675 (1970); Hendryx v. People's United
Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906).
189. Note, Common Law Rightsfor Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Princple, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974).
190. As forms of wealth have changed, the category "property" has been extended from
land to include intangible assets. See J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM
11-16 (1924). Valuable interests change and law has extended protection to new ones as well
as older ones. Thus it is argued that the economic value of a student's status is like other
interests that are protected as property. Note, supra note 189, at 125-32.
191. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 n.7 (1975); Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d
5, 8 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court
ordered wrongful expulsion expunged from school record).
192. Certain memberships and associations have received coercive protection of the law
because society presumes them inherently worthwhile based on widely shared fundamental
values. These values warrant legal protection because they are deemed important toward
promoting a better society, but largely they are considered important in and of themselves as
part of the prevailing social ethic. Note, supra note 189, at 129-32.
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against failure following admission to an educational institution, a notion
somewhat at odds with the idea of recognition of academic achievement.
Additionally, there may be a question of whether a university is truly
analogous to an association such as a social club, union, or professional
society. Despite much talk about the community of scholars, a college is
not a coming together of equals as found in a union or medical association.
Furthermore, a university does not occupy such a monopolistic position as
a union 193 or a state medical association.1 94 A student, expelled from one
school, generally is free to attend another, usually in the same locale, and
thus have access to the same economic or professional interests. Although
a greater deprivation may occur in a professional school dismissal, it may
still be found that there is no monopoly that prevents achievement of eco-
nomic and professional interests. Finally, while the common law rights
thesis may be sound, there seems to be greater reluctance by courts today
to fashion new common law remedies or expand the scope of existing rem-
edies, due to the increasing dominance of statutorily prescribed causes of
action.' 95
III. AN EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO LAW STUDENT DISCIPLINE
The commonly discussed approaches to the student discipline issue,
whether it be the in loco parentis doctrine, contract theory, or constitu-
tional due process, have a coercive character: the courts define what is and
is not necessary when university action is challenged.'96 The resulting fo-
193. In James v. Marinship.Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944), the court
found denial of admission to a union violative of due process because "[w]here a union has,
as in this case, attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop agree-
ments and other forms of collective labor action, such a union occupies a quasi public posi-
tion similar to that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding obligations."
194. In Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 499,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969), the court found that since the defendant association was a
virtual monopoly, determining the standards for the practice and certification of orthodon-
tics, it had a fiduciary responsibility with respect to consideration of membership applica-
tions.
195. For an interesting case where the common law due process rights principle was
unsuccessfully urged in the denial of membership in a national honorary legal society, the
Order of the Coif, see Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1970).
196. Another approach, voluntary in nature, to the problem of student discipline is stated
by Professor Paul D. Carrington in his proposal to abandon what he terms the criminal
model, with its disadvantages and lack of suitability to the university scene, in favor of an
alternate system based on the idea of private civil remedies. Carrington, Civilizing University
Disciline, 69 MICH. L. REv. 393 (1971). Under this civil remedies model wrongdoers would
be expected to repair or replace property damaged or misappropriated, to make restitution
for any medical bills, and in general compensate for pain and suffering, loss of reputation, or
loss of prospective advantage.
Despite this fresh and broadening approach, the civil damages model has some debatable
aspects and limits on its usefulness. It might be an awkward and revolutionary posture for a
university administration to operate as a court of claims, assessing the money value of vari-
ous wrongs. Imposition of an apparatus awarding monetary damages would seem quite
alien to functions of an educational institution. Since the damages model excludes from its
operation strictly academic sins such as cheating, id at 409, there would need to be another
system of discipline to dispose of such matters. Thus adoption of the civil damages system
would not simplify the disciplinary process, but merely add another and different process,
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cus is on what a school must do to comply with externally imposed norms.
Most claims for expanding student rights in the disciplinary process have
been centered on satisfying these external norms. Thus, discussions of the
nature of student discipline have, for the most part, an external perspec-
tive. To the school, the subject of discipline has one immediate concern: it
must be handled expeditiously to maintain institutional order. So framed,
the issue of discipline is a functional administrative concern guided by ex-
ternal norms. A different approach offered here has an internal perspec-
tive and a voluntary character: what should be done about student
discipline and dismissals in view of educational considerations? A sug-
gested answer is a more sensitized process designed to serve as an educa-
tional instrument.
In defining the objectives of legal education, the American Bar Associa-
tion has prescribed that an accredited law school "maintain an educational
program that is designed to qualify its graduates for admission to the
bar." '197 No further explanatory comment is provided in the accreditation
standards. A curious feature about legal education is the universal same-
ness of its basic format and techniques;' 98 yet there is a conspicuous ab-
sence of any official definition as to what "qualifies" one for admission to
the bar. Under this rubric are found the trade school and apprenticeship
exponents as well as the interdisciplinary abstractionists who spurn course
offerings that cover bar examination subjects. There are, however, some
shared ideas, and commonality is noted in the expression of legal educa-
tion as a participatory introduction to the legal profession. The technique
is largely participatory and the objective is professionalization.' 99 Dean
Hardy Dillard has observed: "We would surely all agree that a good legal
education is not a 'thing' that you 'acquire.'. . . Like law itself, education
thereby increasing the burden placed on the school. Some might be offended with the pros-
pect that a student, by paying money for his wrong, may be allowed to remain in school after
potentially serious violations. The idea that the university as a whole had been wronged by
violations would be difficult to satisfy with money compensation. Under this proposed
model, the sanction for failure of a student to pay the damages assessed would be exclusion
from school, id at 410, which raises the same problems that attend expulsion under a more
typical quasi-criminal model. Furthermore, the compensation system seems inadequate to
cope with the student bent on drawing attention to his "cause" by seeking the drama of
expulsion in declining to pay the damages.
197. Approval of Law Schools, ABA Standards & Rules of Procedure, As Amended-
1977, § 301(a). See also H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCA-
TION 22 (1972) (legal education on its most basic level is preparation for the public profes-
sion of law).
198. See, e.g., Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda/or Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 224 (1974).
199. A strictly pedagogical view of legal education may emphasize the participatory
process of the classroom, reflecting a curricular concern with course content and teaching
methods. Under such a perspective, extra-classroom attributes such as the physical plant,
social events, and student activities may not be characterized as an intrinsic part of legal
education. But this seems an unwarrantedly narrow view of the experience. Several extra-
classroom activities offer valuable participatory learning. The law review, while usually a
credit offering, is essentially a nonclassroom experience, as are moot court, legal clinics,
mock trial, and other inter-school competitions. There is little doubt as to the educational
value of such experiences. Student government and similar activities, however, would not
receive the same resounding acknowledgment of educational merit.
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is not a 'thing' but a 'process.' You do not acquire a process, you partici-
pate in it.'2 °
°
This admittedly limited characterization of legal education serves as fo-
cal point for considering the relationship of education to discipline as more
than an administrative function. The Supreme Court has spoken of stu-
dent discipline "as part of the teaching process.",20 1 It has been observed
that the "student's opportunity to confront the disciplinarian. . . is part of
the process of education itself."'212 But in what manner is student disci-
pline a part of the educational process? Perhaps this can be seen in three
formulations: the introduction of law students to the legal profession; the
teaching of substantive and procedural doctrines of due process; and the
fostering of the ideal of justice as served by law as an ordering process.
As to the first of these considerations, the learning about the profession,
a recent American Bar Foundation research program in legal education
reported:
It does seem clear that law school itself has a powerful impact on the
thinking of students about legal education and professionalization.
For most law students, law school is their introduction to the legal
profession and the law. The way in which law school shapes attitudes
about itself may well carry into the public profession and that central
social institution.20 3
A law student not only learns about the profession while in law school, but
his perception of the law school as an institution also shapes his concept of
the profession. It is argued that "law schools perform the function of so-
cializing the law student to the norms of the legal community and there-
fore may have significant effects on later behavior. ' '2 ' This thought was
expressed by Professor Walter Gellhorn in his admonition that law teach-
ers "are under obligation to be more than teachers of law. They must also
• ..be introducers of professional attitudes, obligations, standards." 20 5
The way in which the law school deals with its students in both discipli-
nary matters and academic evaluations must be considered for its profes-
sionalizing effect on all students. While professionalism has many facets,
one important aspect is self-regulation for the public welfare.2 6 The Code
of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of members of
the organized bar, has as its first canon that "[a] lawyer should assist in
200. Commentary by Hardy C. Dillard, Round Table on Curriculum of the American
Association of Law Schools, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 1966) (reprinted in 21 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 532, 535 (1967)).
201. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975): "[Flurther formalizing the suspension
process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as
a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process."
202. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 313 n.128 (1975).
203. Pipkin, Legal Education. The Consumers' Perspective, 1976 AM. BAR FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 1161, 1192.
204. Katz & Denbeaux, Trust, Cynicism, and Machiavellianism Among Entering First Year
Law Students, 53 J. URBAN L. 397, 398 (1976).
205. Gellhorn, Preaching That Old Time Religion, 63 VA. L. REV. 175, 185 (1977).
206. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 197, at 22.
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maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession. 2 ° 7 It is
the obligation of every lawyer to protect the public from those not quali-
fied to be lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education or moral stan-
dards.208
If self-regulation is to have real meaning for a lawyer, perhaps the proc-
ess should begin with the law school, including student involvement in the
regulatory process. As beginning professionals, students would be forced
to grapple with the perplexing problems of competence and to take respon-
sibility for dealing with their colleagues who demonstrate by misconduct
or academic deficiency their lack of qualification to be law students or
lawyers. 20 9 Self-regulation, or at least a significant student role in the dis-
ciplinary process, would enable a student to assume responsibility for his
conduct and for that of his fellow students in a participatory manner:
learning by doing. Student participation could begin with the formation of
a disciplinary code, if none existed, and the student role in the enforcement
process. Professor Charles Allen Wright has observed that the task of
drafting a code belongs to a student-faculty committee.21° The Law Stu-
dent Division of the American Bar Association has argued for a code
drafted by students with annual enactments by the students.2 11 Peer group
consensus tends to have a greater effect on determining actual behavior
than a written code handed down from a superior body. Furthermore,
"professionalism depends in significant part upon adherence to standards
of professional conduct, and. . . those standards must be the product of a
consensus of the members of the profession."21 2 Although exclusive stu-
dent control over disciplinary matters may not be necessary or even desira-
ble, a significant role for the students in the formation and enforcement of
a code would go far to accomplish the educational goal of introducing law
students to the legal profession.21 3
A second identifiable educational opportunity offered by the discipli-
nary process is the teaching of substantive and procedural legal doctrines,
chiefly due process. The long history of due process in Anglo-American
law is a rich and potent focus in the study of law. Justice Frankfurter
noted the utility of due process:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for gen-
erating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice
207. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 1.
208. Id EC 1-2.
209. See, e.g., Bradway, Restraints,- A Proposalfor a Student Code of Ethics, 3 N. Ky. L.
REV. 133, 160, 162 (1976).
210. Wright, supra note 93, at 1064.
211. A Proposed Model Honor Code, ABA LAW STUDENT DIVISION 12 (1971).
212. Id at 5.
213. This is not to suggest that in academic evaluations students be allowed to second-
guess grade awards by instructors. But it does seem that there is room for student participa-
tion on school committees that review challenges claiming factual errors (e.g., in calculation
of grade point average) or bias (e.g., race or gender discrimination).
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has been done.214
Due process as a generalized notion of fairness is thus the central basis to
the law and the practice of law. Important to this notion is the specific
device of notice and hearing. "Some precepts in a lawyer's education are
heard so early and repeated so frequently that the reasons for their legiti-
macy are soon forgotten. Notice and the right to be heard are among
them. They pervade our lives." 215 The underlying rationale of notice and
hearing can be explained as carrying out particular social policies effi-
ciently and achieving order and predictability through accurate fact-find-
ing. 216
The disciplinary process in a law school can serve as an excellent labora-
tory in which to test the effectiveness of due process in protecting interests
dear to law students: their continuation in law school and their potential
careers as lawyers. If there is, as some have said, a movement in legal
education toward learning by doing,217 the dismissal process provides an
opportunity for students to reconcile private interests with the need for
order and common good through the application of traditional due process
tools. One Supreme Court Justice has warned educators not to "teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes" by neglecting fundamental fairness in school dismissals.218
If law schools seriously view discipline as a teaching opportunity for
substantive and procedural legal doctrines, existing procedures for discipli-
nary and academic expulsions may require modification. An initial in-
quiry might be whether a specific, written code of conduct and procedure
to govern disciplinary matters is needed. Some educators feel that "de-
tailed codes of prohibited student conduct are provocative and should not
be employed in higher education. 219 Yet the fundamental legal doctrine
of due process requires notice as to prohibited conduct and the conse-
quences of noncompliance. 220 A penalty should be imposed only for vio-
lation of a preexisting rule, and that rule must be sufficiently precise to
control discretion and to inform those subject to penalties.22' This is a
legal doctrine of merit, worth teaching through its application in discipli-
nary matters.
If law school discipline is to be employed to teach due process effec-
tively, the law school's adoption of due process procedures should not de-
214. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
215. Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard- The Significance of Old
Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 449 (1974).
216. Id at 458.
217. See Cramton, Report to the President of the Universityfor 1975-76, CORNELL L.F.,
Summer 1976, at 1.
218. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
219. General Order, supra note 103, at 146.
220. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-81, 96-104 (1960).




pend on whether it is legally compelled to do so. Indeed, in this teaching
context it might be useful to regard the school as a quasi-government.222
As the law school acts on its constituency, the students, it must do so fairly.
Thus considered, due process should be the guide in all law school discipli-
nary action. This is not to suggest that a full jury trial with its complement
of criminal procedure is warranted. Student discipline is not a criminal
matter, and only fundamental due process notions are essential. Specific
rights will need to be defined in view of this objective. It may be found
that adopting due process as a standard will dictate the granting of more
procedural rights than the courts have required under the fourteenth
amendment. For example, confrontation and cross-examination may be
necessary as "the best assurance of fair and enlightened action. '' 223 And if
the school is to have an attorney in such proceedings, surely the student is
entitled to one as well. 224 Given this value of due process in the educa-
tional context, a stronger case can also be made for student freedom from
unreasonable search and the employment of the exclusionary rule. The
scope of a code of student behavior formulated by faculty and/or students
arguably should not reach strictly academic evaluations, such as grade de-
termination, because these would not be suitable decisions for notice-and-
hearing procedures since they are not factual disputes. On the other hand,
whenever an academic dismissal either involves factfmding or may result
in a stigmatizing effect, some kind of notice and hearing would be appro-
priate.225
A third educational potential in law school disciplinary matters is the
fostering of an appreciation for justice and the role of law in ordering rela-
tions between people and institutions. Any institution of education is,
overtly or covertly, teaching notions of justice, fair play and, as a result,
impressions of the role of law. Schools should be sensitive to their respon-
sibility for treating students fairly. "Scholarship cannot flourish in an at-
mosphere of suspicion and distrust. ' 226 "The American public school
system, which has a basic responsibility for instilling in its students an ap-
preciation of our democratic system, is a peculiarly appropriate place for
the use of fundamentally fair procedures. '227
Law schools should be especially sensitive to the notion of instilling in
its students an appreciation of the ideals of our system of government
through fair treatment. Dean Roger Cramton described the central role of
the law school:
What are law schools all about? They must be concerned above all
with central concepts and values such as justice, order, power, and
freedom. How can we enhance the quality of justice in our society?
222. See Project, supra note 4, at 799-800.
223. Byse, The University and Due Process. A Somewhat Dfierent View, 54 AAUP BULL.
143, 145 (1968).
224. See Wright, supra note 93, at 1075-76.
225. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8-9 (8th Cir. 1975).
226. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
227. Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112, 118-19 (D. Mass. 1969).
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How can we achieve the optimum degree of order that a good society
requires? How can we control and channel official power? How can
we enlarge individual freedom consistent with social responsibility?
And what do these concepts mean? Surely these ideas and values are
related to the qualities of a legal system and to the competence of the
lawyers who work within it. Scholarship and teaching that illuminate
these questions are a central responsibility of legal education.22 s
If the instilling of such values is a central responsibility of legal educa-
tion, reasonable procedures of fair treatment for students in disciplinary
matters should not be viewed as a legal octopus about to strangle the aca-
demic community in technicality, expense, and delay. Instead, due process
should be embraced as serving the very reason for the existence of a law
school: not just the teaching of law in its narrow technicality, but inspiring
the higher view of the law as justice. 2 9 If one role of the law school is to
teach how law orders the relations of people and how institutions dispense
justice, the law school then has a special mission to demonstrate fairness in
dealing with its students and fostering a perception of itself as an institu-
tion dispensing justice. John Rawls has observed: "Thus it is maintained
that where we find formal justice, the rule of law and the honoring of legit-
imate expectations, we are likely to find substantive justice as well." 230
Although a central function of due process notice and hearing is accu-
rate factfinding, due process also operates to promote human dignity.23 '
By affording students the opportunity to be heard, a due process system
implicitly acknowledges their dignity as human beings. Not only are indi-
viduals thereby recognized as important and their viewpoint heard, but
each is also given some measure of self-control and accountability. "One
can thus explain the need for notice and the right to be heard on humaniz-
ing grounds, even if the facts are known and the law clear. 232 By afford-
ing a process of fair treatment and opportunity to be heard, the law school
generates the feeling that the outcome is legitimate and fair, whatever the
results. If nothing else is gained thereby, surely adoption of fair proce-
dures in disciplinary matters will help to counter the consistent student
criticism that law schools are dehumanizing. 233 The infrequency of dis-
missals may reduce the effectiveness of the process as a day-to-day teach-
ing tool, but the very existence of a fair and reasonable procedure would
serve as an educational model and a reminder of basic legal concepts.
In summary, it is submitted that quite apart from any judicial definition
of what due process requires, whether derived from the fourteenth amend-
ment, common law, or whatever contractual relations may exist, a law
school is compelled on educational grounds to provide a disciplinary proc-
ess adequate to satisfy legal and educational demands. There should be a
228. Cramton, supra note 217, at 2.
229. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 197, at 35-36.
230. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
231. Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 215, at 458.
232. Id at 457.
233. See, e.g., Savoy, Towards a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444
(1970).
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reasonable procedure of fair treatment affording notice and an opportunity
for the student to be heard, regardless of the school's public or private
status, or of the disciplinary or academic nature of the matter in contro-
versy. The force for a more sensitized disciplinary process should come
from the school, especially a law school, and the impetus for this force is
the law school's very educational goals.

